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CFB Goose Bay and
Operation “Desert Shield”
James R. McKay

C

anada committed forces to the American-led
Coalition in the 1990-1991 campaign to
liberate Kuwait (Operation DESERT SHIELD and
Operation DESERT STORM). The Navy played
an important role in the naval portion in this
campaign known as Operation DESERT STORM.
Canadian CF-18s provided defensive combat air
patrols over the Persian Gulf region (less Kuwait
and Iraq). Canadian soldiers helped guard
prisoners of war, defend airfields and provide
security for the 1st Canadian Field Hospital
that provided additional health service support.
While all of these were important contributions,
Canada also provided assistance for Operation
DESERT SHIELD. A number of states deployed
forces to Saudi Arabia to aid in that Kingdom’s
defence should Iraqi forces have attacked.
Some Canadian contributions to this operation
remain unacknowledged. The massive victory
in DESERT STORM was a direct result of the
efforts expended in DESERT SHIELD. The two
operations comprise the 1991 Gulf Campaign.
Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Goose Bay played
a little known but remarkable role in Operation
DESERT SHIELD in August 1990. It was, in fact,
the first unit of the Canadian Forces to support
the 1990-1991 Gulf Campaign by acting as a
transit station for the US Air Force’s Military
Airlift Command (MAC) as well as other US Air
Force formations during Operation DESERT
SHIELD.

of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Both bases have
been used by the US military as transit stations
for deployments outside of continental North
America. The histories of the war produced in
Canada tend to focus on the units that participated
in Operation DESERT STORM yet provide a good
account of the lead-up to Canadian participation
in DESERT SHIELD.1 This is, in part, is due to
the fact that Canadian work tends to focus on
overseas operations where forces are placed in
harm’s way. The United States Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) Official History of the
1991 Gulf Campaign, memorably titled So Many,
So Much, So Far, So Fast, provides a detailed
account of both the airlift and sealift operations
supported by a significant amount of statistical
evidence. It identifies some of the American bases
in Europe as well as European military bases
used to support the airlift in its discussion of
routes, but there is no mention of any Canadian
bases.2 The US Department of Defense’s report
to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War (CPGW) never mentions Goose Bay or even
the use of Canadian airspace. It does, however
mention the following:

Problem

•
the Canadian contribution of a CF-18
Squadron,

N

either Canadian nor American official
histories mention anything about the role of
Goose Bay in the airlift that formed the backbone

•
Canadian participation in the maritime
intercept operations,
•
the Canadian contribution of intelligence
personnel to United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) headquarters,
•
Canadian participation in the RED FLAG
series of fighter exercises held at Nellis AFB, NV,

•

the loan of 250 chemical sniffers, and

•
Canadian contractors associated with some
U.S. military equipment.3
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CPGW acknowledges and heaps praise on MAC
as well as the bases that supported MAC aircraft
in transit to the Persian Gulf. Airlift allowed the
United States to react quickly, which was crucial
for the successful defence of Saudi Arabia.4 It has
since come to light that Saddam Hussein had
little intention of invading Saudi Arabia, but in
August 1990, this was not known. For example,
General Chuck Horner, USAF (Retired), then
the Joint Forces Air Component Commander,
recalled that: “…we struggled desperately to build
up our forces knowing that at any time the Iraqi
Army could easily push across Saudi Arabia and
capture not only the majority of the world’s oil
supply but also the air bases and parts necessary
for deploying our forces.”5 The lop-sided victory
in Operation DESERT STORM overshadowed
the desperation felt by the coalition in DESERT
SHIELD.
So why is it the case that the role of Canadian
bases and Goose Bay in particular have been
overlooked? There are two reasons:
•
The mechanisms of defence co-operation
between Canada and the United States made
this a routine manner in a time of crisis, and
•
The actual volume of MAC and other
USAF traffic that passed through Goose Bay
in August 1990 became insignificant in the
months following August 1990 for TRANSCOM’s
historians to mention it.

Yet it must be stated that the volume of MAC
and other USAF traffic forced CFB Goose Bay
to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week
for August 1990. In the eyes of those airmen
providing support to the airlift (as well as the
day-to-day operations in Goose Bay), this was a
major event.

Situation

G

oose Bay had been a transit station since
the Second World War for American
transatlantic military air traffic between the
Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe.
The movement of aircraft from CONUS to Europe
meant that a ‘polar circle’ route would be used.
The first leg of the ‘polar circle’ route meant
that aircraft starting from CONUS would travel
through Canadian airspace and possibly use
Canadian bases (such as Goose Bay) as transit
stations. In the early 1950s, the American and

Canadian governments chose to maintain the
route and apply the NATO Status-of-Forces
Agreement to American forces stationed in
Canada.6 Goose Bay’s importance to the US
military transportation network was not changed
significantly by the increase in the average range
of aircraft. While it would seem logical that as
ranges increased, the requirement for transit
stations would decrease, but the development
of the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to
Germany) exercises meant that the volume of
aircraft bound for Germany would surge every
fall. An annual increase in volume meant that
there would be additional air traffic moving
across the North Atlantic air routes and Canadian
airspace. The US Air Force, therefore, needed
bases in Northeastern North America to provide
refuelling and maintenance services as transit
stations. Goose Bay was a prime location, and
in the fall of 1976, Canada and the United States
renewed their agreement for the use of Goose Bay
by the US Military Airlift Command. Under the
agreement, Canada was to provide, ‘free of rent,’
access to the airfield, existing infrastructure and
support services (less fuel and aircraft servicing).
American forces would be subject to Canadian
policies with regard to the use of equipment,
but the agreement noted that the: “USAF shall
be responsible for obtaining aviation fuels and
lubricants and aircraft ground support services
required for US Armed Forces operations…”7
As a result, the USAF maintained a small
detachment of aircraft maintenance personnel
(approximately 16 strong) at Goose Bay, and
MAC, since that time, “…moved a fair number
of aircraft through the airport, particularly
during the annual REFORGER…”8 The 1976
agreement also included the clause that it was:
“…understood that any substantial change in the
level of US activity at Goose Bay will be subject
to prior consultation between the parties…”9 Ten
years later, the Canadian government signed a
Military Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU)
with the United States, United Kingdom and
Germany for a ten-year lease of facilities at Goose
Bay for low-level flying training.10 Goose Bay
became the home of the NATO Flying Training
Centre (NFTC).
The presence of the NFTC in Labrador led to
Goose Bay becoming a well-known name in the
late 1980s. Since its inception, the NFTC has
been controversial due to the low-level flying. The
Innu have been opposed to its operations due to
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the potential effects on the caribou herds. The
number of training sorties in 1990 suggests that
the pace of activity over the skies of Labrador
was hectic:
•

3,205 German Air Force sorties,

•

944 Royal Air Force Sorties,

•

1,420 Royal Netherlands Air Force Sorties.11

The Innu argued that their safety, culture and way
of life were in jeopardy as a result of the low-level
flying.12 During the late 1980s, Innu protests
(including occupations of range areas, ramps
and other facilities) attracted both media and
political attention.13 The situation came to be so
politically sensitive that the Canadian government
had to take additional security measures. The
Base Historical Report noted that:
…on 10 Apr 90, six defendants attended
Provincial Court and were found guilty of mischief
resulting from charges laid at a demonstration
held by the Innu on the base…a company of
militia deployed to Goose Bay on 16 Apr 90 to act
as perimeter guard to prevent incursions onto
the aerodrome by demonstrators. Op UNIQUE
involved 120 militia personnel from Quebec. The
BDF was also augmented during this period by
35 personnel from other CF units. The exercise
remained in place until 14 Nov 90, the end of
the allied flying season.14

The Innu protests turned Goose Bay into a
political sore spot for the Canadian Government
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and this one offered the potential for international
consequences.
In early 1990, the American government
saw an opportunity with the drawing-down of
the Cold War (and the reduction of the Soviet
threat) to start changing its force postures. In
July, MAC announced that it would withdraw
from Goose Bay. Without a Soviet threat, the
REFORGER exercises would not be required, and
therefore the USAF would not have to maintain its
detachment in Goose Bay. REFORGER ceased to
be incredibly salient. The small USAF presence
in Goose Bay was to be withdrawn.15 It was to
leave a single civilian behind in Goose Bay to act
as the Military Airlift Committee Liaison Officer
(MACLO). The Base Historical Report for the year
noted that: “The MACLO position has already
made a significant impact on Operations, coordinating the transition to the Canadian Forces
of the Non-MMOU transient servicing which was
performed by the withdrawing USAF.”16 The
American withdrawal from Goose Bay had not yet
been completed, but the Canadian Forces were to
provide the maintenance services for American
aircraft using the base as a transit station.

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

I

t is common knowledge that Iraq invaded
Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and that this act
73
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C141 Starlifter of the United States Military Airlift Command on final
approach to CFB Goose Bay on its return flight from the Persian Gulf.

touched off an international crisis. It is equally
well known that the US sought to aid its primary
ally in the Persian Gulf by rapidly deploying
forces to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the
event that Iraqi forces might invade. On 6 August
1990, at a meeting with high level political and
military representatives from the United States,
King Fahd granted permission for American and
other forces to assist in the defence of Saudi
Arabia. The Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM,
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, US Army,
requested that forces begin moving immediately
to Southwest Asia (SWA).17 Such speed meant
that they would have to be airlifted. CONUSbased forces would be moved through Europe to
SWA, and this meant ‘polar circle’ routes would
be used.
The Canadian government was somewhat
surprised by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and it
took a few days to consult with allies and develop
a response. Prime Minister Mulroney spoke
with President Bush on two occasions shortly
after the invasion, namely on 4 and 6 August
1990.18 Three days later, the National Defence
Operations Centre activated a Crisis Action Team

to coordinate the Canadian military response,
which would be centred on a Naval Task Group.19
Goose Bay, however, was far from the centre of
international attention, and it seemed unlikely
that an air force base in one of the more remote
locations in Canada would play a role in the
Gulf Crisis. Military Airlift Command, however,
was more prophetic. One of the Aircraft Control
staff, Private Jeffrey Noel, noted in his journal
that MAC reported that it might need to send
some traffic through Goose Bay as a result of
the invasion.20 On 3 August 1990, there was a
noticeable increase in the number of MAC flights
being pushed through Goose Bay. Private Noel
noted that it was: “…averaging about two an hour
versus two or three a day.”21 This, of course, was
occurring as Hurricane Bertha was ravaging the
eastern seaboard of the United States. Since that
time, Hurricane Bertha has entered the popular
memory as the ‘Perfect Storm.’22 Additional
Opposite: During the initial stages of Operation DESERT
SHIELD an almost constant flow of US military aircraft
transited CFB Goose Bay. Regular visitors were UASF
C5 Galaxy transports.
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American personnel were assigned to the base
to help address the increased volume. The
meteorological section, for example, expanded
to include two USAF forecasters.23 Two weeks
later, a detachment of USAF Air Police arrived
to provide security for MAC aircraft. 24 The
volume of traffic increased further on the 5 and
6 August, and although the Bush Administration
had convinced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
to permit foreign forces on Saudi territory, the
volume of traffic tapered off until 10 August.
The rapid deployment of troops requested by
CINC CENTCOM required the creation of an
“aluminum bridge” of aircraft that spanned
from CONUS to Saudi Arabia.25 This “aluminum
bridge” meant that a large volume of traffic would
be pushed through Goose Bay. This traffic first
appeared over the skies of Labrador on 3 August
1990.26 As Goose Bay was also a training base,
there were significant limitations on the airport’s
availability. Goose Bay only handled MAC and
other aircraft at night and dealt with fighter
operations during the day.
The creation of an “aluminum bridge” that
spanned from CONUS to Saudi Arabia was no
small feat. The TRANSCOM official history listed
the major transit bases in Europe for DESERT
SHIELD as:
•

Torrejon AFB, Spain 31%

•

Rhein-Main AFB, Germany 27%

•

Zaragoza, Spain 18%

•

Ramstein AFB, Germany 14%

•

RAF Mildenhall AFB, UK 6%

•

Rota AFB, Spain 4%.27

There was no mention of transit bases in North
America for DESERT SHIELD. The European
bases were mentioned primarily due to their
provisions of services to MAC aircraft. These
services in Europe were vital, as the airfields
in the Middle East often did not have sufficient
ramp space, fuelling, billeting, cargo handling or
maintenance services.28 Private Noel’s recollection
of the events of the night of 14-15 August 1990
illustrates the importance of the latter:
Several airborne emergencies mixed in with the
traffic: FLEGL 26 (C130 Herc), 21 SOB’s, #1
Engine out; a/c did a fuel dump before landing
safely at 0539z. Second airborne emergency on
another Herc (FLEGL 12); 36 SOB’s, #3 Engine
out, low oil pressure - landed safely at 0735z.
Third emergency was on a C5 inbound with one
engine out, one engine showing fire indication,
72 SOB’s and class A/B/C explosives…29

The schedules for flights within the “aluminum
bridge” were tight. A crew spent five-and-a-half
hours in the air flying from Saudi Arabia to
Spain and had a two-hour layover there. It then
flew seven-and-a-half hours to Goose Bay and
had a two-hour layover there. It then flew for
seven hours to reach Travis AFB for a twelvehour layover before completing the process
in reverse. 30 This hectic pace could not be
maintained without the support provided by the
transit stations.
Yet the provision of support did not mean
that there were no challenges experienced by
the USAF or the CF during August 1990. The
events of 20 August provide a single yet powerful
example. Private Noel recalled that on that day
when he was:
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…driving by the MAC ramp on our way home
to the PMQ and noticed that it was ringed with
portable klieg lamps. Just as we passed, the
MAC ramp [was] lit up like a Christmas tree! [I]
gave Tower a call when we got home and was told
that the C5 that arrived this afternoon had a US
Air Police unit aboard, complete with Hummer’s
and a couple of dogs. The lights are supposed to
block anyone from seeing what’s going on on the
USAF ramp. The Tower actually had to request
that the lights pointing north towards the tower
be shutdown because they blocked out the duty
crews view of the approach to the north/south
runway. MAC Ops took several hours to comply
because they had to get permission from the
USAF in Washington to do so…31

While the American actions may seem comically
paranoid in trying to secure a remote location
from hostile acts, there were other sources of
potential interference. Private Noel recalled
that on 30 August 1990: “Of all the things to
happen today, the Innu decided that it was
their time to protest low-level flying by cutting
through the south perimeter fence adjacent to
the USAF ramp. Don’t these people realize that
there is a war on!”32 The American reaction
was, understandably, fraught with alarm. The
Base Historical Report noted that: “MP [Military
Police] and Op UNIQUE [Airfield Defence and
Security] forces responded to the first and only
Innu demonstration of 1990 on 30 August and
successfully prevented an attempted incursion
onto the runways.”33 Given the politically-charged
nature of the debate over low flying, this could
have become a significant controversy. Swift
intervention prevented a political problem from
influencing the Coalition’s operations.

Airlift in the Operation

S

o how many MAC aircraft actually passed
through Goose Bay on their way to and from
the Persian Gulf in August 1990? The Base
Historical Report stated that:
August saw the beginning of the USAF Military
Airlift Command’s support for Operation Desert
Shield. Over one thousand heavy transport
aircraft staged through Goose Bay in a 60-day
period. The Met Section provided 1478 briefing
[sic] to USAF crews during Aug and Sep. ATC
Section increased personnel on shift to meet the
demand for services created by the late night
movements of C5s and C141s.34

The exact number is reliant on official sources,
and due to the reporting methodology, subject
to interpretation. The Report noted that there
were 2,183 USAF ‘itinerant’ flights that passed
through Goose Bay in 1990.35 This includes the
entire year and all USAF traffic, and as a result,
it does not focus on purpose or destination.
Approximately 67 per cent of the ‘itinerant’ flights
from 1990 occurred in August and September.
The BHR also compared annual transits by type
of strategic airlifter or refueller, and this shows a
significant increase from 1989 to 1990 in these
types of aircraft.
Figure 1: Annual Transits by Aircraft Type

*Jan-Mar 1991

A similar comparison to previous year can be
found for the month of August 1990 in the total
number of flights as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Annual Transits by Purpose36

While the data above shows an increase in the
number of American strategic airlift aircraft that
passed through Goose Bay, it does not draw
a direct link between the airlift in support of
DESERT SHIELD and Goose Bay, although we
would assume the increased volume is exactly
that.
There is, however, other evidence. One of the
Annexes to the Report did state that in August
1990, USAF aircraft flew from Goose Bay to the
following destinations:
•

94 Flights to the UK

•

157 Flights to Germany

•

246 Flights to Spain

•

7 Flights to Saudi Arabia.37

These flights matched some of the routes
described in the US TRANSCOM official history.
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It is likely that the flights to the UK were bound
for RAF Mildenhall or other USAF installations
in the UK. The flights to Germany were bound
for Rhein-Main AFB or Ramstein AFB and the
flights to Spain were headed to Torrejon, Rota
or Zaragoza. The Base Report also noted that
these flights represented 20 per cent of the annual
USAF itinerants in only a single month, meaning
20 per cent of the annual amount occurred in 8.3
per cent of the time.38 Private Noel expressed it
in more human terms: “Since the airlift began,
we’ve averaged 51 MAC birds a day, with 102
alone yesterday!”39 He went further and provided
a more detailed analysis by noting that the:
…traffic count for the month is 7,236 - an
increase of 1,389 over last August. That increase
is exclusively MAC birds, but we’ve had more
than that because the RAF stopped flying midmonth so tack on another 400-500 movements
to make up for them. That should put MAC
movements around 1900 since 3 August (65 per
day); since most MAC movements occur during
the nightshift that makes 5 per hour per 12 hour
night period or 1 every 12 minutes . . .40

On 17 August 1990, the RAF suspended its
flight operations in North America pending a
redeployment of RAF assets to the Persian Gulf.41
By Private Noel’s analysis, the increase in flights
(by almost 1900) was directly attributable to

the MAC flights in support of DESERT SHIELD.
This is a significant difference from the 504
flights identified in the Base Historical Report,
but this same Report noted that almost 1500
meteorological briefings were given to USAF
crews in August and September 1990. If all
flight activity matched that of the aforementioned
USAF crew from Travis AFB, where aircraft
that flew to the Persian Gulf via Goose Bay also
returned through Goose Bay, then the number
of MAC flights associated with DESERT SHIELD
was approximately 1,000. The BHR noted that
in August 1990, the United States was the
destination for 487 flights.42 One could draw
the conclusion that Goose Bay was used as a
transit station for aircraft returning from the Gulf
as well as a transit station for aircraft headed
to the Gulf. The TRANSCOM official history
stated that there were 1,668 flights in support of
Operation DESERT SHIELD in August 1990.43
This suggests that Goose Bay was a transit
station for roughly two-thirds of the MAC flights
between CONUS and the Persian Gulf in August
1990. Goose Bay was not just one of many bases
that supported the ‘aluminum bridge’. It was a
significant contribution to a larger effort. MAC
made 16,203 flights from the start of DESERT
SHIELD to the redeployment in April 1991. Yet
the vast majority of Goose Bay’s MAC traffic

Several KC135 aerial tankers occupy spots on the USAF ramp at CFB Goose Bay. These particular aircraft were deployed
to CFB Goose Bay during the initial buildup of Operation DESERT SHIELD and carried out air-to-air refuelling operations
off the Labrador coast for fighter aircraft enroute to the Persian Gulf.
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Top left: Part of the US Army’s Aviation
Force to transit CFB Goose Bay was an
OV 1C Mohawk light observation and
reconnaissance aircraft.
Above left: A US Army RC-12 Guardrail electronic
surveillance aircraft was one of the many ‘smaller’
American military aircraft to pass through Goose Bay.
The RC-12 was a heavily-modified Beech King Air and
was used as an electronic signals intelligence platform
that operated at the forward edge of the battlefield to
record enemy transmissions.

Above left & right: An RAF Victor aerial refuelling aircraft,
nicknamed “Saucy Sal.”
Below left: A Pan Am Boeing 747 redeploying troops to the
continental United States via Goose Bay.
Below right: Mission score painted on the side of another
aerial tanker recently returned from the Gulf indicate the
aircraft flew 66 combat support, 32 cargo and 16 other
missions in support of the Royal Saudi Air Force.

Above: RAF GR1A Jaguar ‘Mary Rose’ in desert
camoflage, 28 July 1991. The markings on the side
of the aircraft indicate that it flew 36 bombing, and 1
strafing mission during the first Gulf War.

occurred in August 1990, and over time, its
significance to the ‘aluminum bridge’ waned with
the volume of traffic in the Fall of 1990.
Goose Bay’s role in DESERT SHIELD/
STORM has been all but forgotten. While aligning
practices in peace with those in war is one of
the best things a military force can do (within
legal limits of course), there are unintended
consequences. Ironically, during the Cold War,
the REFORGER series was a dress rehearsal
for an unforeseen war in the Middle East. Due
to the similarity of the airlifts associated with
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a REFORGER and that of DESERT SHIELD,
the drama associated with the task has been
reduced. In this case, the lack of drama
contributed to Goose Bay’s role being overlooked
by the historians in Ottawa, Washington, and at
TRANSCOM Headquarters in Scott AFB, IL. Yet
Goose Bay was a Canadian link in a broader
chain of bases used to support the ‘aluminum
bridge’ to the Persian Gulf. More importantly,
it played a role in the liberation of Kuwait even
before the Canadian government committed the
Navy or for that matter, the country to that task.
It should be remembered.
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Call for Papers
17th Military History Colloquium
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
Co-sponsored by The Laurier Centre for Military
Strategic and Disarmament Studies and the
Canada Research Chair in Conflict and Culture,
Department of History, University of Western
Ontario
5-6 May 2006
The Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and
Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University,
and the Canada Research Chair in Conflict and
Culture, Department of History, The University
of Western Ontario, invite proposals for papers
to be presented at the 17th Military History
Colloquium, to be held at the University of
Western Ontario on 5-6 May 2006.

Announcing the
7th MARCOM CONFERENCE

Maritime Command, along with the Directorate
of History and Heritage, is holding a two-day
conference on Canadian naval history at the
new Canadian War Museum located at 1 Vimy
Place (near the corner of the Ottawa River
Parkway and Booth St.) in Ottawa on Thursday
22 September and Friday 23 September 2005.
Panels will convene in the Barney Danson Theatre
at 0845 and finish at approximately 1630 on
each day. While topics on all aspects of naval
history will be presented, the conference will
emphasize the technological side of the navy’s
weapons, platforms, and tactics during the Cold
War Period. There are no conference fees but
for planning purposes those wishing to attend
are asked to pre-register by writing to mayne.
ro@forces.gc.ca. Information packages will be
emailed upon registration.

The primary focus will be on all periods of
Canadian military history - pre-1914, First and
Second World Wars, the Korean War and post-1945
developments including peacekeeping. Proposals
for papers advancing new and innovative
perspectives will receive first consideration.
Papers addressing all facets of military history,
including tactics and operations, social and
cultural issues, economic impacts, and the home
front, from the colonial era to the present day will
be considered. Proposals are welcome from all
scholars, but graduate students and recent Ph.Ds
are especially encouraged to submit.

Please submit a one-page proposal to
Mike Bechthold, Laurier Centre for Military
Strategic and Disarmament Studies
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext.4594; Fax: 519-8865057; email: mbechtho@wlu.ca
www.canadianmilitaryhistory.com
The deadline for proposals
is 24 February 2006.
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